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ABSTRACT
Friendship is used here as a conceptual vehicle for framing questions about the distinctiveness of human 
cognition in relation to natural systems such as other animal species and to artificial systems such as robots. 
By exploring this very common form of a human interpersonal relationship, the author indicates that even 
though it is difficult to say something generally true about friendship among humans, distinct forms of friend-
ship as practiced and distinct notions of friendship have been investigated in the social and human sciences 
and in biology. A more general conceptualization of friendship as a triadic relation analogous to the sign 
relation is suggested. Based on this the author asks how one may conceive of robot-robot and robot-human 
friendships; and how an interdisciplinary perspective upon that relation can contribute to analyse levels of 
embodied cognition in natural and artificial systems.
Robot Friendship:
Can a Robot be a Friend?
Claus Emmeche, Department of Science Education, University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen, 
Denmark
Keywords: Embodiment, Friendship, Norms, Robot, Self, Semiotics, Social Cognition
INTRODUCTION
The question posed here is one about an aspect 
of human cognition and emotion that is often 
overlooked or ignored, namely friendship, and 
its possible instantiation in artificial systems 
such as robots. Can robots be friends? Probably 
for most people it seems a bit weird to sug-
gest so, or to imagine that humans and robots 
can enter into interactive dynamics similar to 
friendship. The intuition that something would 
be missing for two artificial systems really to be 
‘friends’ may well be right, but as always with 
intuitions in the context of research they need 
to be articulated, and articulating this intuition 
– or counter-claims that robots could not be 
friends – demands a deeper understanding of 
not only the specificities of human cognition, 
but also the relation between cognition and 
affection, and the nature of friendship. This 
article focuses on the later.
The claim of this paper is not that friend-
ships between robots, or between humans 
and robots, are impossible. The suggestion is 
to keep the question – about possible future 
realizations of friendship in human-robot or 
robot-robot relations – open, and investigate 
more in detail what friendship among humans 
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might tell us about similarities and differences 
between natural human cognition (including 
distributed cognition) and artificial robotic 
cognition. Friendship and social cognition in 
general has been seen as important for the de-
velopment of an autonomous self in humans, 
and this may thus teach us something about 
human autonomy and agency. In the fields of 
Cognitive Science, Robotics, AI and Artificial 
Life, the focus has often been one of building 
adaptive systems intelligent enough to solve 
practical tasks such as survival, transforming 
sensory information into organized knowledge 
to guide movement, and learning instrumental 
skills needed for supporting human action and 
cognition. This kind of instrumental rationality 
and intelligence is important for individual ac-
tions in many technical domains, but may not 
be sufficient for all social actions in domains 
where values and norms play an important role. 
By asking questions about forms of human 
friendship and the possible existence or non-
existence of robot friendship, we also ask what 
it means to say that rational purposeful human 
action in the social domain is guided by norms. 
Such norms are of a social character, they are 
expressions of self-control, and they regulate 
not just the action of isolated individuals, but 
emphatically social individuals, that is, indi-
viduals socialized through their development, 
like social organisms of other species, or like 
the ‘political animals’ (Aristotle) we are qua 
living in societies with social institutions.
The relevance of discussing friendship in 
the context of robots is far from being a nov-
elty; this concern has appeared in the history 
of robotics, although nobody has offered an 
analysis of the meaning of ‘friendship’ in this 
context. Remember that robotics is not only a 
science, fundamental as well as applied, it is 
also a field hybridizing with science fiction. 
This is exemplified by the career of Mark 
Tilden, robot scientist, author and technical 
consultant on movie scenes involving robots.1 
Part of Tilden’s claim to fame is his inven-
tion in the 1990s of what became known as 
“Tilden’s Laws on Robotics”, namely: 1) A 
robot must protect its existence at all costs; 2) 
a robot must obtain and maintain access to its 
own power source; 3) a robot must continually 
search for better power sources.2 This may not 
sound especially friendly, but more like rules 
for Hobbesian agents, all fighting against all. 
They were suggested as indicating new design 
principles for a more interactivist and embodied 
approach to robot architecture, provocatively 
echoing and subverting science fiction author 
Isaac Asimov’s “Three Laws of Robotics” from 
1942,3 that were concerned with the dangers to 
humans of the construction of robots. Asimov’s 
laws stated that: 1) A robot may not injure a 
human being or, through inaction, allow a hu-
man being to come to harm; 2) a robot must 
obey the orders given to it by human beings, 
except where such orders would conflict with 
the first law; 3) a robot must protect its own 
existence as long as such protection does not 
conflict with the first or second law. These 
laws seem friendlier and they support an under-
standing that robots should basically serve as 
safe tools for humans. However, it is difficult 
to see Asimov’s second law about obedience 
as enabling anything like a real friendship to 
emerge, at least if we understand that relation 
as something between equal beings with a high 
degree of autonomy. This brief indication of a 
history attached to the debate about the nature 
of robot-human and robot-robot relations suf-
fices to surmise that much attention has been 
paid to safety and utility issues, and much less 
to issues of deeper interpersonal relationship 
or true friendship.
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We will proceed in the following way. 
Approaching the question of robot friendship 
requires a specification of what is meant by 
friendship. This word in common language is 
quite polysemous. Friendship has been under-
stood as a social tie, a non-institutional institu-
tion, a form of love, or simply a recurrent form 
of non-antagonistic interaction among selected 
agents. Thus, in the first section we will briefly 
review a small selection of the research literature 
on friendship in an interdisciplinary perspec-
tive, including both philosophical and empirical 
research from the sciences and the humanities. 
In the next section we suggest a semiotic con-
ceptualization of friendship that highlights the 
mutual cognitive interpretation of oneself by 
another being, and that other by oneself. Based 
on these two sections we argue that friendship 
in its modern form, both as an ideal and to some 
degree as practised, is a norm-governed relation 
that is historically contingent upon a civilizing 
process forming human social behaviours and 
emotions, and leading to increasing degrees 
of human self-control. In this form, friendship 
can be seen within a framework of emergent 
levels of embodiment that differentiate zoo-
social, anthropo-cultural and societal contexts 
for particular forms of friendship. With these 
building blocks for a theoretically richer notion 
of friendship we return to the question about 
friendship among robots to suggest that even 
though robots can be made to act friendly, it 
is not clear to what extent they can enter into 
relations of friendship unless robots could also 
have the same emotional, cognitive and social 
capacities for sign interpretation that humans 
have. Thus, overall, friendship appear in this 
context as a conceptual vehicle for framing 
questions about the distinctiveness of human 
cognition in relation to both other natural 
systems such as other animal species and to 
artificial systems.
FRIENDSHIP RESEARCH 
IN THE NATURAL, HUMAN 
AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
As indicated, the approach taken is not to block 
inquiry by any predefined notion of friendship, 
but rather let the investigation be informed by 
what is known about friendship phenomena in 
general, from various theoretical and empiri-
cal fields of research. This is not the same as 
broadening our everyday notion of friendship 
to the extreme by taking a deflationary stance 
which would imply that by friendship we not 
only mean among human beings (and eventually 
robots) but also ‘friendship’ between a person 
and the house, bike or any other things that he 
or she likes.4 Neither does it mean that we take 
every sort of brief, polite, ‘friendly’ relations 
between persons, groups, or communities to be 
an instance of friendship. It rather means that 
we are interested in being able to recognize both 
diversity and commonality, both a variety of 
interpersonal friendship forms, and similarities 
in the multifaceted patterns of friendship known 
by people. And we are interested in the origins 
of such forms of sociability in our natural and 
cultural history.
Biology and Evolution
Social ties as studied in ethology are of course 
not understood as mediated by institutions or 
language as in humans. However, social ties of 
kinship or friendship in non-human species are 
often seen as protoforms of the same relationship 
types we know from human societies. Although 
humans are distinctive in terms of institutions, 
culture and language, ethologists and evolu-
tionary biologists ask to the biological ‘basis’ 
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(or preconditions) of specific human features. 
Discussing “the human biology of F” where F is 
some identifiable human feature with a number 
of biological and other preconditions, there is 
a shifting balance between two narratives of 
which the first is the most dominant: 1) F as 
a distinctively human trait is determined by 
and fully explainable by Darwinian selective 
mechanisms acting “as-if-selfishly” (as altruism 
is a case of ‘selfish’ genes working through the 
mechanics of kin selection). 2) F may or may 
not be humanly distinctive, but evolutionary 
mechanisms can also yield genuinely ‘social’ 
and ‘amiable’ outcomes, and such features can 
also be observed in animals. If we take F to 
stand for friendship, the first narrative is roughly 
exemplified by evolutionary psychology, the 
Darwinian trend in psychology (Tooby & Cos-
mides, 1996; Lewis et al., 2011; Silk, 2003), 
while the second is a more recent and subtle 
movement among ethologists who explore the 
fact that social behaviour need not be aggres-
sive or even “as-if-selfish” to be kin selection, 
although it is still adaptive and functional for 
the individuals engaged.
The focus of ethology is on animal be-
havior under natural conditions. After a long 
phase of behaviourism with a focus on simple 
conditional learning mechanisms, attention was 
turned to more complex instances of cognition-
based and social behaviour, and reference to 
‘information processing’, or ‘representations 
in animal cognition’ became tolerated, inspired 
by the development of cognitive psychology 
and cognitive science; cf. the work on vervet 
monkey communication (Gallisted, 1990; 
Heyes & Huber, 2000). This cognitive and social 
turn in ethology paved the way for a new set 
of questions pertaining to non-sexual bonding 
behaviors – tentatively called ‘friendship-like’ 
– in a range of animals and birds. The volume 
Animal Friendships (Dagg, 2011) summarizes 
this recent turn by covering different types of 
alleged friendship among a variety of species, 
most primates but also birds, mountain goats, 
giraffes, bisons, buffalos, reindeers, etc. Many of 
the relations covered have only a slight similarity 
with any specific human notion of friendship 
and are realized among kin, like male–female, 
sisterhood, brotherhood, parent–adult offspring, 
or stable bonds within larger family groups in 
social animals. However, also instances of so-
called “platonic relationships” (sic, p. 12) among 
male and female olive baboons are reported, 
i.e., “relationships that provide protection for 
the female and her young” (ibid., p. 12). An-
thropologist Joan Silk famously organized the 
first symposium on the subject of friendship 
in non-human animals (Silk, 2002) at a time 
when many primatologists denied that relatives 
can be true friends, because they thought that 
such relations could and should be reductively 
explained as a form of automatic self-interest 
(called reciprocal altruism in the sociobiological 
literature). Anne Dagg duly notes the criticism 
made by Barrett & Henzi (2002) that perhaps 
there are no friendships among primates, and 
that we can never know what a monkey perceives 
as a friendship, but she counters that
…observations in the field show that in many if 
not most social species, individuals do not act 
randomly toward their neighbors while being 
sociable, but prefer to interact positively with 
some individuals rather than others. In this 
book, we consider friends to be those individu-
als who do interact affirmatively (Dagg, 2011, 
p. 228, n.7). 
This, however, seems to be a rather meagre 
concept of friendship, at least judged from a 
human point of view. In a recent contribution 
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primatologists Seyfarth & Cheney (2012) claim 
that convergent evidence from many species 
(horses, elephants, hyenas, dolphins, monkeys, 
and chimpanzees) reveals the evolutionary ori-
gins of human friendship. They refer to research 
documenting the occurrence of bonds among 
females, among males, or between males and 
females. They also acknowledge that genetic 
relatedness affects what they term friendships 
in primates: In species where males disperse 
from their social group after becoming adults, 
friendships are more likely among females. If 
females disperse, friendships are more likely 
among males. But Seyfarth and Cheney also 
emphasize that not all friendships depend on 
kinship; many are formed between unrelated 
individuals. Friendships often involve coop-
erative interactions that are separated in time. 
They depend, at least in part, on the memory 
and emotions associated with past interactions. 
Applying the term “friendship” to animals is 
not seen as anthropomorphic (as claimed by 
Henzi & Barrett, 2007): Seyfarth & Cheney 
posit that although “relationship” is widely 
used as a descriptive term, no primatologist has 
ever claimed that monkeys, apes, or any other 
species can anticipate their future social needs. 
To the contrary, when scientists have speculated 
about the mechanisms underlying long-term 
relationships they have typically assumed that 
current behaviour is affected, wholly or in part, 
by the individuals’ memory of past interactions. 
Furthermore, there is now
…an extensive literature indicating that animals 
recognize other individuals’ relationships. (...) 
Animals also recognize the close bonds that 
exist among others. In playback experiments 
conducted on vervet monkeys and baboons, 
females who heard a juvenile’s scream were 
likely to look at the juvenile’s mother (…) The 
representations that underlie such recognition 
undoubtedly differ from one species to the next 
and certainly differ from humans’ more explicit 
social knowledge, but there is no doubt that 
animals acquire and remember information 
about other animals’ relationships and that this 
knowledge affects their behavior. (Seyfarth & 
Cheney, 2012, p. 165). 
These primatologists see friendships 
as adaptive; males with allies have superior 
competitive ability and improved reproduc-
tive success; females with the strongest, most 
enduring friendships experience less stress, 
higher infant survival, and live longer. Their 
basic idea is that for instance baboons in fact 
form friendship at the practical level of life in 
the social group, and although these monkeys 
have no explicit categories (not to say ideals) 
of friendship, they have certainly expectations 
and an implicit complex knowledge of the 
social relations among other members in their 
group. Seyfarth and Cheney conclude that we 
“can therefore see the evolutionary origins of 
human friendships in the social bonds formed 
among nonhuman primates.” (ibid., p. 171). 
What we see here is an attempt to broaden the 
complex question of causality to several levels 
of explanation, beyond those of genes and kin 
selection, and acknowledge that several puzzles 
(like that of explaining the evolutionary origin 
of cooperation) are involved in accounting for 
the biology of friendship (cf. the review by 
Brent et al. 2013).
Anthropology
Phenomena of friendship seem to have an 
ambivalent status within anthropology, first 
because it is contested whether there are any 
universal cross-cultural facts to be learned 
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about friendship as a human relation, or if the 
very idea of any such traces of universality in 
the plural forms of friendship is just a cultural 
(i.e., Eurocentric, Western) construct; second 
because it is often important for fieldworking 
anthropologists to be ‘on friendly terms’ with 
their informants, to the extent that friendship 
is even considered by some to be a ‘method’ 
useful for fieldworking anthropologists and 
qualitative researchers (Tillmann-Healy, 2003). 
Perhaps this ambivalent status of friendship as 
both object and method helps explain why the 
anthropological literature on friendship remains 
“relatively sparse” (Brandt & Heuser, 2011, 
p.147) as noted by the authors of a comparative 
study of cross-cultural friendships and family 
ties, in New Zealand between members of the 
Māori and the European-Pākehā population, 
and in Java between inhabitants with a highly 
divers national and cultural backgrounds.
So in anthropology there is a high sensitiv-
ity to the fact that the ways the concept of friend-
ship is understood in the West, as for instance 
articulated in its philosophy, may be specific 
to western societies at a certain point in time, 
expressing more an ideal than a reality, and that 
friend-like terms in other languages should be 
seen as highly situated culture-specific idioms 
demanding careful reading on a background of 
specific contexts. According to Torresan (2011), 
anthropologists see friendship in either of two 
ways. Some take friendship as a specific kind 
of relationship contingent on a Western notion 
of the self-conscious individual,
…a product of the transformations brought 
about by capitalism and its effects on the so-
cial codes and moral constraints that separate 
individuals from society and instil in them the 
modern distinctions between private and pub-
lic domains. Being a personal and voluntary 
relationship comprising emotions that belong 
in a private place – the individual domain – 
friendship could only be performed in private by 
people who identified with each other. According 
to this model, friendship implies a relationship 
between social equals who can maintain a bal-
anced reciprocity without the interference of 
material interests. (ibid., p. 238).
Other anthropologists see friendship as 
a social process constituted within different 
cultural contexts and therefore more contextual 
and diverse than the private, personal relation-
ship rendered in the Western model. In this 
second view,
…this Westernised ideal type would be seen as 
a specific manifestation that does not hold true 
even in the very Western societies to which it 
has been associated. Here, friendship and the 
emotions it evokes are part of a multiplicity 
of interconnected relationships that cross the 
social and individual spheres. (ibid., p. 238)
In these different spheres, friendship is 
simply enduring personal ties in which affection 
and trust are key elements.
Both kind of views are represented in 
the collection of Bell & Coleman (1999); the 
second view being the most prevalent. E.g., in 
Brazil, according to Rezende (1999) friendship 
is not confined to a private sphere; rather, it cuts 
across all aspects of personal and social life. The 
term friendship is used to express feelings of 
affinity, affection, and trust towards people in 
similar or distinct social, economic, and racial 
locations, and combining ideas of individuality 
and choice with the need for relating to others in 
any given context. “Thus, rather than referring 
to equality, which is closely linked to a modern 
‘Western’ conception of the person as having 
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identical rights, friendship should be seen as an 
idiom of affinity and togetherness” (Rezende, 
1999, p. 93).
Philosophy
Also philosophers have played with the idea 
that friendship is a notion with no essential core 
meaning, but a term in language for different 
things that are related by what Wittgenstein 
called family resemblance, so that in studying 
instances of friendship we find “a network of 
features, which, while similar, are not present in 
the same degree or in the same combination in 
all instances of friendship”, and “consequently 
we might not be able to identify a central sense 
of the term” (Lynch, 2005, p. 21; cf. Konstan, 
1997, p. 18; and further developed in Digeser, 
2013). Although this is a way of recognizing 
the multiple meanings (or uses) of the term, 
contemporary philosophers most often approach 
friendship as an ethical relationship (distinct 
from both erotic love and neighbourly love) 
that has been idealized, for good or worse, by 
many thinkers in the slim western canon of 
philosophical texts on friendship, e.g., Plato, 
Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, Aelred, Aquinas, 
Montaigne, and Emerson (all represented in 
Pakaluk’s (1991) collection). This tradition is 
indebted to Jewish, Catholic and Protestant dis-
courses of love in its various forms. Reviewing 
another collection of philosophical treatments of 
friendship in a range of cultures, a commentator 
stated that “[w]hat certainly emerges from the 
essays on China, Japan, and India is that in these 
Oriental cultures there is apparently nothing to 
compare with the concentration on friendship as 
a major theme which characterizes all cultures 
influenced by the Graeco-Roman philosophy 
and Semitic religions (including Islam) at least 
up until modern times” (Burns 1997, p. 351).
The work of Singer (2009) illustrates some 
general aspects of contemporary philosophy 
of friendship: It is often embedded within a 
philosophy of love that distinguishes friend-
ship as a particular kind of love. A philosophy 
of friendship needs to deal with the kinds of 
affections and attitudes involved, and the extent 
to which such affections overlap affections in 
other relation types. Furthermore, a philosophy 
of friendship does not need to be articulated as 
an explicit philosophy; also artistic work such 
as poetry or novels can express philosophical 
themes of friendship, and subsequently be used 
as a source for philosophical interpretation. 
There are no sharp borders between philoso-
phy, literature studies and other approaches to 
friendship. A philosophy of friendship may 
try to categorize distinct types of the relation 
(e.g., ordinary vs. heroic forms). Often the very 
categorization is contested, but may serve as a 
preliminary tool to assess a variety of friend-
ships. A philosophical taxonomy frequently 
takes form of a normative hierarchy, like the 
Aristotelian distinction between friends of 
utility, of pleasure and of virtue (in Aristotle, 
only friends of virtue are considered as ‘real’ 
friends in the fullest sense; yet friends of utility 
and of pleasure, though wanting in virtue, are 
still friends; such less supreme relations are 
still thought of as being formed by the supreme 
kind). Moreover, a historical dimension is often 
emphasized in an attempt to map major shifts 
in the conception and ideals of friendship. This 
empirical and sociological point is manifest 
in the structure of Singer’s treatise covering 
both ancient, Christian-medieval and modern 
conceptions, and in his pluralist method of 
“philosophical history” tracing “the formation 
of ideals” (2009, v.2, pp. xx-xxi) to provide a 
conceptual analysis. Finally, contributions to 
the philosophy of friendship may be guided 
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by some overall philosophical conception or 
theory; in Singer’s case his view of love as a 
dispositional attitude to action, and as a dual 
form of valuation comprising both creative-
valuative bestowal of emergent value within 
the relation, and evaluative appraisal of useful 
or pleasurable existing value for the individual 
in question (2009, vol.1).
Contemporary accounts of friendship are 
often given by philosophers who, like Singer, 
along with conceptual analyses provide edifying 
or epistemic alternative models of friendship, 
for instance a model of friendship predicated 
on difference between the friends rather than 
similarity (Lynch, 2005), or a model that sees 
friendship ‘from below’ avoiding to romanticize 
or idealize the relation as something perfect, 
exquisite and very rare, and instead takes a more 
pragmatic stance to its inherent ambiguities 
(Vernon, 2005). A third model proposes to use 
ancient resources like the Homeric eposes and 
Greek tragedies to construct a classic-modern 
ethics of friendship in its aspects of self-discov-
ery through receiving and accompanying the 
other through life as a person (Holst, 2013). A 
fourth account rejects a strongly individualistic 
conception of persons, often taken for granted 
in philosophy, and sees friendship as a kind of 
plural agency, analysing how our emotional con-
nectedness with others is essential to our very 
capacities for self-determination (Helm, 2010).
Other Disciplines
This overview is far less than a review of all 
work on friendship in the social sciences and 
the humanities. One often finds a high degree of 
interconnectedness or ‘internal’ interdisciplinar-
ity within each discipline. We have seen how 
some questions about modern vs. non-modern 
friendship forms recur in philosophy and anthro-
pology, and also in sociology this is discussed. 
An example is the debate initiated by Giddens 
(1992) who claimed that in traditional societies, 
the available choices for individual action were 
mostly predetermined by the customs. In a post-
traditional society people are less concerned 
with standards set by earlier generations, and 
they have more choices, due to flexibility of 
law and public opinion. Thus, individual actions 
now require more analysis and thought; society 
is more reflexive and self-observant, and this 
also applies to intimate relationships. Intimacy, 
in Giddens’ optic, means “the disclosure of 
emotions and actions which the individual is 
unlikely to hold up to a wider public gaze” 
(ibid., 138). This diagnosis, however, has been 
contested by sociologists who argue that “the 
constraints placed on the practices of friendship 
by the norms of heterosexuality, as well as the 
social divisions of gender, class and ethnicity, 
illustrate how far removed everyday friendships 
typically are from ‘the pure relationship’.” 
(Jamieson, 1998, p. 105). Needless to say, also 
the history, psychology, social psychology, and 
politics of friendship form important areas of 
research that cannot be commented upon here.
A SEMIOTIC 
CONCEPTUALIZATION 
OF FRIENDSHIP
Suggesting a semiotic perspective upon 
friendship serves two purposes here, related 
to interdisciplinarity and to cognition: (i) If 
the aim is to study friendship by integrating 
different comparative perspectives within an 
interdisciplinary field, it might help to have a 
more general idea about the relation of friend-
ship, an idea broad enough to be worked out 
in many special ways, and simple enough to 
nourish a vision of continually making progress 
in understanding friendship dynamics (among 
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humans or robots) based upon such a guiding 
idea. (ii) Friendship in humans involves an 
advanced kind of social cognition whereby 
the very life of one agent is expanded through 
the relation to that of the friend – as one author 
noted, “each friend represents a world in us, a 
world possibly not born until they arrive, and 
it is only by this meeting that a new world is 
born.”5 This expansion also allows both friends 
to think together in dialogue, and thus expand 
each person’s own reasoning – on self, identity, 
and Other within the relation, and on the sur-
rounding world situating the friends.
In order to develop a more general concep-
tion of friendship with special affinity to its 
emotional and cognitive aspects, one option 
is to focus on the many ways that friendship 
is addressed, represented and interpreted, 
and see them all, though different, within the 
perspective of semiosis, the action of signs. 
Friendship as a form of love, a social bond 
concretely situated and embodied, a relation 
essential for personhood, for having a self, and 
for having a responsible belonging to a com-
munity; friendship as a term in language that 
is not fully possible without reflective uses of 
language – all these aspects could seen within 
a guiding schematic idea, that of sign action 
or the logic of signs. It may engage research-
ers from various disciplinary backgrounds to 
participate in fleshing out this idea in different 
ways. In the literature of friendship studies, and 
in the classical traditions of philosophy, history, 
sociology, etc., there are resources for such an 
inquiring venture.
A suggestion for further exploration could 
be that friendship is a relation with an irreducible 
triadic structure, basically similar to the sign 
relation in Peirce’s semiotics, the general logic 
of sign action. In this perspective, friendship 
as a relational category can be conceived as a 
complex relational sign-like structure, which 
is triadic and thus structurally richer than mere 
dyadic relations. A semiotic-pragmatic first take 
on a conceptualization of a friend could be:
F1: A friend is a First (a Self) which stands in 
such a relation to a Second (an Other), 
as to be capable of determining a Third 
(called their Friendship) to assume the 
same relation to the Other in which it (the 
Self) stands itself to the same Other.
A way of reading this would be to see the 
Third as the normative component of a me-
diational structure, for instance, some guiding 
principles that can subsume individual actions 
under a set of norms, the idea of friendship (a 
complex sign that may consist of several ideas in 
interaction). To emphasize that the First within 
the relation is not simply the total psychic self 
of a person as such, but a self in the process of 
presenting and interpreting itself and being in-
terpreted by another, we may call that processual 
representation of the self for Another-Self (to 
hint at Aristotle’s original notion of the friend 
as another self). Furthermore, as the other as a 
Second is not any other but an existing person 
addressed as a ‘you’ in a relation that is, or is 
about to become, a mutual one, we could call it 
the Other-You. Thus we arrive at an expanded 
formulation:
F2: A friend, or Another-Self, is a First which 
stands in such a genuine triadic relation 
to a Second, called its Other-You, as to 
be capable of determining a Third, called 
their Friendship, to assume the same triadic 
relation to the Other-You in which it stands 
itself to that same Other-You.
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The triadic relation is genuine, i.e., its 
three members are bound together by it in a 
way that does not consist of any complexus of 
just dyadic relations. This is in formal analogy 
with Peirce’s 1902 definition of a sign:
S1: A sign, or Representamen, is a First which 
stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a 
Second, called its Object, as to be capable of 
determining a Third, called its Interpretant, 
to assume the same triadic relation to its 
Object in which it stand itself to the same 
Object. (CP.2.274 [my emphasis, CE.])
Implied by the analogy is that friendship, 
belonging like signs to the category of media-
tion, or Thirdness, is an interpretative evolving 
relation of communication allowing for a joint 
kind of distributed cognition where the friends 
who follow some parts of their life together also 
partly think together in joint communication. 
Friendship as an interpretant (a dynamic com-
plex triadic structure) in the sense of Peirce does 
not have to be an explicit instance or process of 
interpretation, it is rather the joint trajectory of 
friendship as a little community that translates 
two individual selves into an interlaced unit, 
an evolving habit of dialogic action, influenced 
by the enacted norms of friendship defining the 
character of the relation.6 A potential interpre-
tive activity is presupposed by the concept of 
signhood, but the subject of that activity does 
not have to be a single mind. The interpreter 
might be, but need not be an individual, and 
many places Peirce locates the interpretive 
activity in the community (Skagestad, 2004, p. 
245). The Peircean approach allows for a more 
general account of the ‘plural agency’ that one 
finds in true friendship,7 an agency that has a 
triadic structure even for what seems to be just 
two friends in a so-called ‘friendship dyad’. 
Friendship in general can never be a relation-
ship between just two individuals, as it always 
involves a third instance. This third instance 
is mediational, and not only of an intellectual 
character, but also related to norms, values, 
affections, or what we could call the emotional 
interpretant, understood here as being the first 
proper significate effect of friendship (cf. Peirce, 
CP.5.475).8
This semiotic notion of friendship could be 
further developed, as what we have indicated 
is not only true for a single triadic unit of two 
friends in a friendship. Such a unit has implica-
tions for the wider community, and the next step 
would be to inquire into the relation between 
the friends and this wider community. Such an 
inquiry can take many forms, but the point in 
relation to robotic friendship, as we shall argue 
below, is that such relationships need to be seen 
in a wider context of human communities.
SOCIETAL EMBODIMENT 
OF FRIENDSHIP
As we saw, both in anthropology, philosophy and 
sociology, a special form of friendship – vari-
ously called ‘western’, ‘modern’, or ‘the pure 
relationship’ – is discussed and contrasted with 
more casual and broader uses of the term in a 
variety of contexts (for kin, patrons, etc.). The 
modern notion of friendship (that is not com-
pletely absent in ancient sources, cf. Aristotle on 
‘perfect’ friendship) is characterized by a set of 
features, addressed differently by philosophers, 
sociologists, anthropologists, etc. that may be 
listed like this, in no particular order:
• The relation has a private rather than public 
character, and is only quasi-institutional 
(‘institutional’ only in the sense of a con-
ventional accept of its contrast to more 
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institutionally entrenched and legally 
regulated relationships such as marriage 
or parenthood);
• Is affectionate and to some extent pref-
erential and exclusive – the particular 
other person means something existentially 
special to you, and unless your heart is 
infinite, the number of people to whom 
you can have this kind of relation is finite 
(and less than the number of ‘friends’ you 
can have on Facebook);
• Is constituted by liking and caring for 
the person for his or her own sake (the 
relation is not primarily entered for some 
instrumental reason, though benefits from 
the relation are not excluded) – there is an 
honest wish to see the friend thrive and 
flourish (so as a form of love the relation 
is not possessive);
• Is mutual, dialogic, and with some degree 
of realistic assessment of its nature, whether 
passionate or calm (there is no unrequited 
friendship – infatuations and unrequited 
love are a different domain);
• Is constituted by a sharing of important 
parts of the life of the two friends, shared 
doings, exchanges of thoughts and expe-
riences, and thus also investigative, open 
to novelty, curious of better knowing the 
world, the other self, and how the other 
sees oneself;
• Characterized by confidentiality and trust, 
making possible the sharing of secrets, 
disclosing things to the friend that one 
normally would keep outside the public 
sphere;
• Entered voluntarily and based upon mutual 
respect and regard for similarities as well 
as differences between friends;
• Presupposing a surplus of time and material 
goods, i.e., characterized by affordability 
and generosity (but not being focused upon 
or constituted by any needs for political or 
material of support in the fight for survival 
or social advancement);
• Never perfect, and accepting imperfections 
both in the relation and in the friend, but 
reflective about gaps between reality and 
ideality; and vulnerable to the breaking off 
the relation by one of the friends.
These features, although listed separately, 
are partly interdependent. In this notion, friend-
ship emerges as a norm-governed relation that 
is contingent upon the existence of certain 
emotional, cognitive and social boundary condi-
tions that make such a relation possible at all. 
One very material condition, as mentioned, is a 
surplus of time, curiosity, and capacity to afford 
a free space for actions not primarily guided 
by concerns of self-defence or survival. Both 
the ‘guest-friendships’ related in texts from the 
ancient Greece (Holst, 2013; Konstan, 1997) 
and the institution of ‘big-manship’ known from 
the Icelandic sagas (Durrenberger & Pálsson, 
1999) are examples of such ‘strategic’ or politi-
cal friendships dictated by a sheer need to have 
some reliable allies in a rough social world 
with no states, no social or political security 
and no strong institutions that could guarantee 
individual rights or a minimum of law and order.
So at a relatively recent societal level of 
human life, a special kind of friendship relation 
(in lack of better words called ‘modern’) – that 
includes certain forms of social cognition related 
to identity, interpersonal understanding and 
self-understanding – seems to have emerged 
based upon certain material preconditions that 
are also of a macro-historical kind. Anticipations 
of this relation may have been partly realized 
by the elites of ancient societies, but only later, 
with the generalization to broader groups of a 
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society of the material conditions needed to 
more fully realize this interpersonal relation, it 
could take a form that would be recognized by 
a much higher percentage of the world popula-
tion (and eventually denoted as ‘true’ or ‘close 
friends’, ‘soul mates’ etc.).
It is obvious that even though some animals, 
like olive baboons as we saw, may have ‘friends’ 
(demanding some form of social cognition such 
as recognizing relationship types among other 
members in the group), such a relation is of a 
very different kind than those more complex 
ones involving humans, of which modern friend-
ship takes a distinct form. This brings into focus 
semiotic analyses of “semiotically competent 
body types” (Stjernfelt, 2007, p. 257) or differ-
ent “forms of embodiment” (Emmeche 2007, p. 
468). The important point here is not the exact 
number of embodiment types (or biosemiotic 
thresholds of increasing complexity) but to anal-
yse a continuity of increasingly complex forms 
of semiosis and acknowledge the existence of 
different thresholds, such as the one between the 
shared attention upon some types of relation-
ships, as in the baboons (Seyfarth & Cheney, 
2012), and more complex forms depending 
upon language and institutions and also the 
formation in language of a concept about such a 
relation. This marks the threshold to a particular 
anthropic form of embodiment, universally 
characteristic of humans as creatures forming 
distinct language-dependent socio-cultural 
groups (as humans are “the abstract animal”; 
Stjernfelt, 2007, p. 241ff). In the case of modern 
friendship, this form is related to a societal form 
of embodiment (Emmeche, ibid., p. 471ff), 
tied to the emergence of societies with intense 
division of work and different social institu-
tions, as only they enable a distinction between 
private and public spheres, and are productive 
of a degree societal wealth and surplus time as 
necessary boundary conditions for this kind of 
friendship. In the political sphere ‘friendship’ 
may still have a survival character of forming 
strategic alliances, while in the private sphere, 
less ‘strategic’ forms of friendship can thrive. 
Thus, a long civilizing process forming human 
social behaviours and emotions (Elias, 2000) 
leads to increasing degrees of self-control and 
differentiation of types of interpersonal relation-
ships. In this process, modern friendship can 
be seen within a macro-historical framework 
of emergent levels of embodiment that differ-
entiate, first, a universally human anthropic 
plurality of friendship types in distinct cultural 
forms, and secondly, in some societal contexts, 
creates particular modern forms of friendship.
EMBODIED ROBOT 
FRIENDSHIP?
The work of Peirce allows for a further reflec-
tion on the relation between human self-control 
and friendship as facilitating such a regulative 
habit. Self-control as a general phenomenon 
depends upon the organism’s semiotic capac-
ity. As a non-dualist synechist thinker Peirce 
saw a continuity of levels of control within an 
organism such as a human being. There are
…modes of self-control which seem quite in-
stinctive. Next, there is a kind of self-control 
which results from training. Next, a man can 
be his own training-master and thus control 
his self-control. When this point is reached 
much or all the training may be conducted in 
imagination. When a man trains himself, thus 
controlling control, he must have some moral 
rule in view, however special and irrational it 
may be. But next he may undertake to improve 
this rule; that is, to exercise a control over his 
control of control. To do this he must have in 
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view something higher than an irrational rule. 
He must have some sort of moral principle. 
This, in turn, may be controlled by reference 
to an esthetic ideal of what is fine. There are 
certainly more grades than I have enumerated. 
Perhaps their number is indefinite. The brutes 
are certainly capable of more than one grade of 
control; but it seems to me that our superiority 
to them is more due to our greater number of 
grades of self-control than it is to our versatil-
ity. (CP.5.533)
In this moral aspect of self-control, friend-
ship and other social relations play a role, as the 
social norms and sociability in general teach the 
individual to aim at diminishing the distance 
between an ideal (such as “of what is fine”) and 
the real actions performed by the agent, and also 
to reflect critically upon rules to improve them. 
This would also apply to “autonomous robots” 
– which perhaps ironically would have to be just 
as interdependent upon a community, as humans 
are, to be considered just as ‘autonomous’ as 
humans, being able to exercise control over 
their control of control. The robots we know of 
today are only quasi-autonomous in the sense of 
being “hooked-up in socio-technical networks, 
including human technicians to keep them 
functioning” (Emmeche, 2007, p. 477). The 
robots of today are being made (cf. Asimov’s 
rules) to act friendly towards humans. But it is 
far from clear to what extent they can enter into 
relations of friendship unless also having the 
same emotional, cognitive and social capacities 
for sign interpretation that humans have. They 
may be programmed to show a kind of friendly 
behaviour or seek out allies to collaborate to-
gether, perhaps similar to the behaviour of the 
olive baboons. We have not yet seen higher 
levels of self-control in robots, nor signs of 
friendship – neither on the universal human 
level of culturally specific forms of anthropic 
embodiment nor on the societal level where 
one of the forms of friendship is the modern 
one, emphasizing self-disclosure, intimacy, and 
reflexive exploration of identity. Of course, it is 
difficult to forecast how complex behaviour that 
robots (equipped with clever machine leaning 
algorithms for adapting interactively to humans 
and other robots) may achieve in the future. 
One thing to notice is that just like the brutes 
in Peirce’s quote, the robots will certainly be 
capable of more than one grade of control. And 
similarly it seems to us that our superiority to 
robots is more due to our greater number of 
grades of self-control and semiotic competen-
cies than it is to our versatility, adaptability and 
multiplicity of specific cultural adaptations. 
However, the human versatility, also indicated 
by the high variety of friendship forms, may be 
seen exactly as an expression of the semiotic 
freedom made possible through higher-order 
controls and semioticity.
CONCLUSION
We have used the interpersonal relation of 
friendship in this context as a conceptual 
vehicle for framing the question about the dis-
tinctiveness of human cognition and emotion in 
relation both to other natural systems (such as 
non-human primates) and to artificial systems 
build by humans (such as robots). Often when 
embodiment is discussed in relation to cogni-
tion and action, the focus has been on whether 
robots could implement semiotic capacities 
similar to animals for their adaptive behaviour. 
By choosing a relation that seems to be dis-
tinctively human, although with evolutionary 
protoforms in animals, the full spectrum of 
forms of embodiment is brought to attention, 
including specific human forms. This allowed 
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us to approach the question of robotic friendship 
in a more precise way: Whether robot-robot or 
human-robot friendships are possible will de-
pend upon the chosen model of friendship, and 
whether an artificial system can emulate such 
a model. Here, an interdisiplinary perspective 
upon friendship including the social sciences 
and the humanities is indispensable. Taking a 
‘modern’ model of friendship as an example, 
robotic friendship will demand higher-order 
forms of self-control than those we know how 
to emulate in the artificial systems of today 
(which does not make it impossible per se). 
Furthermore, the question cannot be answered 
within a purely individualist framework, so 
easily presupposed talking about ‘autonomous 
robots’, because friendship, as seen in a semi-
otic perspective, constitutes a little moral and 
dialogic community in interaction with norms 
and values of the wider community. Robotic 
friendship, if it is to be realized, cannot be 
conceived as a closed dyad, but only as triadic, 
social and societal. Perhaps this applies also to 
the robot as an entity that is not simply a thing, 
but a product of collective human labour and 
ingenuity.
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ENDNOTES
1  The entry on Tilden (http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Mark_W._Tilden), assessed December 
2013.
2  See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tilden%27s_
Law_of_Robotics, assessed December 2013.
3  See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Three_
Laws_of_Robotics, assessed December 2013.
4  In the treatise on love by Singer (2009) the 
notion of love includes the love of things, of 
persons, and of ideas. But ‘loving’ or ‘liking’ 
things, such as a place, is a non-mutual rela-
tion very different from the core notion of 
friendship between two relatively autonomous 
agents.
5  Anaïs Nin, March 1937 (in: Gunther Stuhl-
man (Ed.) 1967. The Diary of Anaïs Nin, 
Vol. 2: 1934-1939 (p. 193). Orlando, Florida: 
Harcourt Brace & Company)
6  The semiotic model of friendship is compat-
ible with an analysis of the self in friendship 
given by Cocking & Kenneth (1998), stating 
that “as a close friend of another, one is char-
acteristically and distinctively receptive to 
being directed and interpreted and so in these 
ways drawn by the other”, thus on account 
of this receptivity to my friend’s interests 
and interpretations of my traits, “I develop 
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in a way that is particular to the relationship; 
the self my friend sees is, at least in part, a 
product of the friendship.” On this account, the 
self is a dynamic and, we must add, semiotic 
phenomenon too, viz. “the self in friendship 
is, in part, a thing that is constituted by and 
particular to the friendship” (ibid., p. 510).
7  Compare Helm (2010) whose account of 
plural agency is Davidsonian.
8  I thank professor Ivo Assad Ibri for suggest-
ing the relevance in this context of Peirce’s 
notion of the emotional interpretant and the 
ground of signs. I also thank João Queiroz, 
with whom I collaborate to develop this notion 
further, for the correspondence.
